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RXOWLEDGE INTERPRETED AS LANGUAGE
BEHAVIOR
BY LESLIE A. WHITE
M\N has spent a great deal of time thinking about himseit.
Piqued by voracious curiosity, he has attempted to define his
station in the cosmos. The range of his speculations and conceits
extends from filial kinship with a Creator, in whose name he pre-
sides over the planetary center of the Universe, to status as one of
many forms of organic life, precariously and temporarily infesting
an insignificant speck of dust in a universe of suns.
Out of this prolonged speculation have grown many "problems,"
one of which is the problem of knowledge. There has been much
speculation about Intellect and Knowledge. \"olumes have been
written on Epistemology, in attempt to determine what knowledge
is, whether or not it is possible, and how. Nowadays, we are not
so much concerned with deciding questions dialectically as empiri-
cally. The tendency is to take the human being as a datum rather
tlian a pre-conceived hypothesis; to study him objectively rather
than to pit our notions of him one against the other.
This point of view makes possible a new approach to the prob-
lem of knowledge. We may dispense with such questions as whether
nr not knowledge is possible or "real." We may begin with the
individual, examine him in any way that we can. and report our
lindings. Whether or not this method will reach the "ultimate nat-
uw" cif knowledge, is a question that may well await upon a thor-
ough and exhaustive examination of our datum.
Instead of metaphysics, we may begin with common sense. We
Ikuc an animal lliat cats, sleeps, talks, laughs, wears clothes, uses
lools. etc. There has been a great deal of energy dissipated in try-
ing to determine man's place among animals. Without going into
this litigatit)u. uc nia\- cite current reputable authority to the eft'ect
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that man differs from the other animals in his use of an articulate
language and material tools. (Mind of Primitive Man, Boas, p. 96.)
We accept this tentatively, as it is the best we have at this time, but
we should not hesitate to modify or discard it should further inves-
tigation make it necessary.
In our studies of animals, we have on the one hand behavior
and on the other the biological organism. We may study one inde-
pendently of the other, or we may attempt to correlate a datum in
one cycle with a fact in the other. Thus we may examine the struc-
ture of the organism, its composition, arrangement of parts, etc..
without regsrd for its behavior; or we may occupy our attention
with the behavior of the organism without regard to its mechanical
structure ; or we may correlate an act of behavior with a part or
structure. We thus have three distinct modes of attack, any one,
or all, of which we may use. In this paper, we shall avail ourselves
almost exclusively of one method, that of the study of behavior, i. e.,
what a person does where knowledge is concerned. We shall, per-
force, leave the examination of the organism to further investiga-
tion and instrumental experimentation, and. necessarily, the corre-
lation of the two cycles must wait upon this also.
The homing pigeon performs a feat which we can not explain
in organic terms. Human conduct presents facts which can not be
correlated with facts of the organism. But. keeping in mind the
distinction made above, we see that we are justified in pursuing the
facts of one cycle to the disregard of the facts of another. Our
procedure here will be to deal with the facts of human behavior
which have to do with knowledge, as this term is used in common
sense.
As we have seen, man differs from other animals chiefly in the
use of an articulate language and materiak tools. These are objec-
tive facts of behavior. AA'e do not know exactly what goes on in
the organism when this behavior occurs, so we say that man Jws the
capacity for abstraction. Just as the homing pigeon returns to his
cote when released, not knowing Jioti' he does it, we say that he has
a capacitw or instinct, for this kind of behavior. The term "capacity"
here is just another way of saying that the organism does something.
The implication of the expression "capacity for abstraction" is
that man's conduct involves an object that at once bears a relation-
ship both to himself and to some other object. Thus a stone bears
a relation tc a fist and at the same time to a clam : the stone is used
bv the fist to crush the clam : a spear is used as an extension of the
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arjH to wound a foe: poison is taken from a serpent's fangs and put
on an arron'-tip. Thus man's conduct involves relationships be-
tween one external object and others as well as to himself. Animals,
are ego-centric; for them an external object bears only one relation-
ship, which is to them direct—they do not use tools.
A word is similar to a tool in this sense. Language may use
vocal utterances, written characters or gestures. In either instance
the situation is the same in this respect : Something is done or made
by the body. This act possesses a degree of objectivity which bears
relationshios both to its author and to some other object. Thus a
word itself becomes an objective datum and bears a relationship both
to him \\ho uses it and to some other object, relationship or event.
.\ word, then, is something like a tool, that man alone of all animals
uses because of "his power of abstraction."
^^'e have now a way of studying "knowledge" in an objective,
empirical way. Whether there is any knowledge that exists apart
from language is a question that may be considered after we have
done all we can w ith this method of study. The problem as it ma^
be stated now is this: We have an animal, man. who uses words—
a
language. The use of language is accomplished by bodily acts—be-
havior; language (or thinking) is a process of the body just as truly
as are respiration and digestion. We mention this fact merely to
illustrate our point of view : we are not here concerned with a cor-
relation of physiological processes with words, but we take for
granted an organism with the capacity for this kind of conduct. We
wish to study and interpret this conduct which consists in the use
of words.
The use of language means labrlUng the universe. .\ word may
be looked upon as a label which is attached to something else. It
must be kept constantly in mind that a word has an objective exist-
ence of its own. and that it bears a relationship both to him who
uses it and to that which it labels. A w^ord may label an object, a
relationship or an event. Thus, such material objects that present
themselves to our senses, as rocks, clouds, trees, etc., are labelled
;
these labels are nouns. Events, in the sense of occurring or hap-
pening, are labelled, and we have verbs. Relationships are labelled
by words classed as i)repositions conjunctions, etc. We thus have
the whole universe of "being" and "doing"—objects and move-
ments—translated into a language order, conceptual rather than
perceptual. But this language order is itself of an objective nature
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as well as subjective, and it is the reaction of the body (biological
organism) to this language order that constitutes "knowledge."
We have already seen how the universe as it presents itself is
labelled with words. What then is "thinking" in such an interpre-
tation? "Thinking" is a word that labels a physiological, bodily
process that consists in the manipulation of words. (The term
"thinking" may sometimes be used to designate a bodily process that
does not involve the use of words, such as reverie, dreams, etc. I
prefer to call these processes dreaming, and to reserve the word
thinking for language processes.) Distinction must be made between
words as mere vocal utterances and words as language. A parrot
may vocalize a word, but he has no language ; he is ego-centric and
does not possess "the power of abstraction," already explained.
Hereafter in this paper it shall be understood that the term "word"
shall be used in the sense of language.
Thinking, then, is a bodily process of manipulation of words in
a certain way, for it is obvious that mere mouthing of words in a
haphazard way does not constitute thinking. We must analyze and
define this special way of manipulation of words. A baby is bom
with a greater or lesser number of pattern reactions, such as sneez-
ing, but most of his behavior is learned. It requires some time for
an infant to accomplish the eye-hand coordination, and it requires
still further time and training for him to use an instrument or tool
to do something to something else, e. g., to eat with a spoon. It is
in the same way that language habits are built up, from the behavior
standpoint, disregarding the physiological processes correlated with
these acts of behavior. Just as the baby learns to make the eye-
hand-spoon- food-mouth combination, he learns to make the various
combinations in the manipulation of words. The baby makes use
of certain things in his environment in eating, bringing into the proc-
ess such things and in such a combination as are necessary to accom-
plish his purpose or end—eating. Language is a part of one's en-
vironment as truly as spoons and food are, and it is in a similar way
that it is employed in efifecting changes and accomplishing end:?.
Language, then, in its simplest forms, is simply a manipulation of
words, in certain combinations, with reference to the things which
the words stand for, and w^ith reference to the purpose or end to be
accomplished.
What then is 'knowledge" in terms of language behavior? What
do we mean when we say that one "knows something"? A micro-
organism avoids contact with some chemical; is this knowledge? A
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dog will not come into tlio house because he "knows" someone will
kick him: is this knowledge? A small boy "knows" that two times
two are fonr. and that Tokyo is the capital of Japan ; is this knowl-
edge? "Regardless of terminology, there is an essential difterencc
between the first two instances and the third. \\> prefer to reserve
the term "knowledge" to apply to the last mentioned example. It
is in this instance that we have manifested that "capacity for abstrac-
tion" which differentiates man from brute. The "knowledge" of the
boy who knows that Tokyo is the capital of Japan and that there
are whales in the sea. is based upon the use of words which at once
bear a relationship to him and to some other facts which they repre-
sent. The first two examples cited are cases of ego-centrism solely.
The meaning of a word is simply the recognition of its dual re-
lationship—to the user and to that which it represents. This recog-
nition is accomplished by the physiological organism in a way that
can not as yet be explained in physiological terms. Xo more can
we explain the "homing instinct" of the homing pigeon in physio-
logical terms. \\'e have these physiological capacities given, and in
studying behavior, we take them for granted The meaning of a
word is the same as the meaning of a tool. A savage uses a spear
or a hammer. These have meaning to him ; they supplement his
physiological equipment and effect changes in his environment. A
tool has meaning both to the user and to the material upon which it
is used. A word has meaning to that which it represents just as
truly as it does to him who uses it. We do not know why an ape,
who has the physiological structure to use tools and language does
not do so: we onlv know that he does not use them, and that man
does.
An idea is a \\-ord combination. Tt is not a haphazard collection
of words, but an arrangement in such a fashion as to accomplish a
jiurpose or to achieve an end. This is not to be thought of in any
metaphysical teleological sense, but in a common sense wav. Just
as one would lay a log across a stream in order to crt^ss it without
wetting his feet, or use a needle to pick a thorn out of the flesh, so
an idea, or word combination, is an arrangement o\ such words as
will acc()nij)lish some pnrjxise or end, such as description, command
or inquiry. The criterion of an idea is the correlation of the words
and combination used wilh the objects, events and relationships
which they represent, and also with the purpose of the user. The
same is true with tools, in the (wo instances given ab(~ivc. one could
not interchange the needle and the log and accomplish the desired
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ends. We may have idea combinations as well as word combina-
tions.
Knowledge consists, then, in the acquisition of language habits
—
word combinations. (The use of the term "language habits" must
not be confused with Watson's language habits. There may or may
not be similarities, but our use of the expression in this paper is
entirely independent of the definitions and theories of Watson.) It
is true that one learns something by discovery, such as radium, bac-
teria, etc., but this does not become knowledge until it has been
translated into the language order. We may now view knowledge,
or bodies of knowledge, such as History. Literature, Mathematics,
etc., in the light of our interpretation, as consisting of congeries of
word or idea combinations, that have meaning to us and to objects,
events or relationships for which they stand.
How is learning to be interpreted in terms of language behavior ?
It is said that one learns ''by experience." We also learn by stud>
ing. We do learn by experience, as the dog learned to avoid kicks
by staying out of the house. We learn in laboratories by dissecting
frogs, mixing chemicals, etc. But we also learn by reading and
listening to lectures. W^e learn of the past in History, of foreign
countries, of the heavenly bodies, etc. But this, too, is a form of
experience, experience in which we are subjected to a discipline of
word and idea combinations instead of to those things which they
represent, so that the distinction between learning by experience and
by study disappears since both are experience. Furthermore, what
we learn by dissecting frogs is not knowledge in the human sense
any more than a dog who turns a roasting spit has knowledge, until
it has been translated into the language order of behavior.
How are we to interpret "abstract thought" in light of our the-
ory? We have seen that we may have word combinations (ideas)
and also idea combinations. We also know that these word-idea
combinations may be labelled. Thus, instead of having some other
object, event or relationship which words represent, they may stand
for other \\ord-idea combinations. This is abstract thought. Take
"justice" for example. First we have simple words which label the
objects (or persons) involved, and we have words which label 7(.'hat
these objects do, how and upon ivhat they act. We make various
word-idea combinations which correspond to these various data.
These are ideas; (word) reflections upon the phenomena. (Reflec-
tions in the sense that they are reflected by the data and phenomena
themselves.) Then we label these idea combinations with a word
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which then stands for a word-idea combination, or a series of word-
idea combinations. Thus '"expansion" is a word which labels a
group of word-idea combinations, which represents certain objects
and events. Likewise do "justice" and "liberty" stand for word-
idea combinations. The manipulation and use of these labels con-
stitutes "abstract thought." Abstract thought dififers from concrete
thought in that instead of having other objects and events as a cor-
relative it has word-idea combinations as its correlative.
Invention and Discovery. What is an "original idea"? How is
"creative thought" to be interpreted? Let us begin with random
movements and pointless manipulation, and with material objects
instead of words. Random movements and manipulation will result
in successive combinations in arrangement of environment and oper-
ator, just as successive throwing of pennies will result in ditterent
combinations of heads and tails. The manipulation may be pomt-
less and without plan, but should a certain permutation or combina-
tion come about that strikes the operator as being of value, useful
or desirable, he may seize upon it and try to repeat and preserve it.
It is in some such way as this, we believe, that the wheel was dis-
covered, and no doubt the bow and arrow. ITere we have an object-
combination. X'ow suppose we have several of these object-combi-
nations, the inclined plane, the screw, the wheel, the lever, etc. These
object-combinations are then subjected to various manipulations in
the course of the activities of their users. In the course of this
manipulation these object-combinations come into contiguity and a
combination is made of object-combinations, e. g.. the wheel, lever.
screw, etc.. may be combined into a machine. In this way inven-
tions are made. The steamboat was simply a combination of the
steam engine and the boat, both of which had previously existed for
many years. An invention, then, is the combination of one object-
combination with another object or object-combination.
'i'he sanu' is true of wt^nls ami ideas. In the process of niani]nila-
tion. one word-idea combination is brought into contact with another
word-idea combination, forming a new combination. Should there
prove to be any advantage to or desire of the operator to preserve
this combination, he does so, just as the object-combinations were
f)rcserve(l in tools and machines. Thus Darwin got certain ideas
from Linnaeus, some from Malthus. others elsewhere. Manipula-
tion of these ideas led to a combination—an hvpothcsis. "If X be
true and Y be true, then Z must also be true." This represents the
process of bringing together two discrete facts or ideas, and conclu-
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sion which is drawn in the combination formed. Hypotheses, theo-
ries and laws are thus resnlts of combinations of idea-combinations.
Education and Knoidcdgc. Education consists very largely in
a discipline of and practice in the language order. Working with
actual material such as in the laboratories, in clinics, and in field
surveys has an important place in education. But to a greater ex-
tent, one works with the word order that represents these primary
data. Thus one learns and "knows" about the circulation of the
blood, the customs of African tribes, the orbits of the planets, the
life of Bismarck, the climate of Egypt, the British Labor movement,
the endocrine glands, etc., without ever coming into primary con-
tact with the original data themselves. The subject-matter of the
student is very largely a secondary order—a language order—which
takes the place of the primary order—the original data. Thus the
subject-matter of the student of economics is the zvritijigs (and lec-
tures) of men on economics. The point is that education consists
to a very great degree of a discipline of word-idea combinations
rather than the original data themselves. Of course, this has to be
so to a great extent, but it might be maintained that it is carried
too far. Thus many students and scholars instead of dealing with
the primary data, concern themselves almost exclusively with what
Aristotle, Adam Smith, Darwm, Comte, \\'undt, Spencer. Boas.
James or Dewey said ajjout them. This tendency to attend to tlie
secondary word-order* rather than to the primary data order has
resulted in the accumulation of a great cumbrous mass of "knowl-
edge"' which consists of what one man said about what another
scholar ^vrote about what some predecessor of his thought about
something else, etc., etc.. and education consists largely in preser\-
ing the past by subjecting students to its discipline rather than direct-
ing attention to primary-fact data.
Siinnnary. We wish to interpret "knowledge" in terms of be-
ha^'ior which can be studied empirically, objecti\-ely. We take for
granted man's "capacity for abstraction." which means the use of
language and tools. Knowledge, from our viewpoint is language
behavior. This consists in the use of words, which bear at once a
relationship to some object, event or relationship and to him who
uses the word as well. The meaning of a word is this dual rela-
tionship, just as the meaning of a tool is a dual relationship to the
user and to the material upon which it is used. Ideas are word-
combinations for a purpose, as object-tool combinations are iti the
material culture. Hypotheses, theories and laws are idea-combina-
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tions. Idea combinations are labelled with words which are called
abstract words, such as "liberty," "cohesion.'' "justice," "relativity,"
"expansion." etc. Original ideas and creative thought are new com-
binations made between one idea combination and another idea or
idea-combination. This is accomplished by the historical process
of manipulation in the same way that inventions (new combinations
between object-combinations and other objects or object-combina-
tions) are made, or grow, in the material culture. Knowledge con-
sists in systems of these idea-combinations which are embodied in
an objective language order, which may be analyzed into primary,
or idea systems which represent objects and events, or secondary,
which consists of idea-combinations which represent other idea-com-
binations. Education consists largely in dealing with this secondary
order ; attention is directed to word-orders which represent data,
rather than to the data themselves.
